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PRIVATE AND PUBLIC REMEDIES FOR FRAUDULENT
BUSINESS PRACTICES IN CALIFORNIA: THE
IMPORTANCE OF A STRONG PUBLIC ROLE
The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the public-
that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are
governed by appearance and general impressions.1
In the not too distant past, the relationship between consumer and
merchant was fully expressed by the ancient doctrine of "caveat emp-
tor."2 The marketplace functioned on a laissez-faire basis and the ex-
istent remedies for frauds practiced upon consumers were minimal.3 In
recent years, however, there has been a burgeoning public awareness
of the dangers inherent in this traditional relationship, an awareness
reflected in the continuing movement for the creation of consumer
councils designed to educate and inform and in the sudden flurry of
legislation dealing with consumer problems.4 Nevertheless, despite
1. Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Mitchell, 172 Cal. App. 2d 235, 244, 342 P.2d 10, 16
(1959), quoting Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948).
2. See generally Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133
(1931).
3. At common law, the major remedies for consumer misrepresentation were pur-
sued through an action in contract for damages or recission or an action in tort for
fraud or deceit. Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the
Consumer Have a Private Remedy? 1968 DuKE L.J. 831, 835, 850, 860 [hereinafter
cited as Hester].
4. Within the last two years the following major consumer protection statutes were
passed: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 9880 et seq. (West Supp. 1973) (creates in
Department of Consumer Affairs a Bureau of Automotive Repair to regulate certain
aspects of automotive repair industry); id. § 17533.8 (prohibits offering someone, by
mail or telephone, a prize or gift with the intent to offer a sales presentation upon
delivery absent revelation of such intent); id. § 17535 (amends section to expressly
authorize courts to grant restitutionary relief to persons harmed by unfair or fraudu-
lent business practices); id. § 17538 (requires mail order companies, unless otherwise
indicated in advertisement, to deliver goods ordered, to make a full refund, or to give
notice of delay or substitution together with offer to refund within one week, within
six weeks of accepting money); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1689.6 (West Supp. 1973) (creates
a,three day right of revocation with respect to any home solicitation contract); id. § 1720
(suspends accrual of interest, financing and similar charges on a retail installment con-
tract should the obligee fail to timely respond to an inquiry concerning a debit or credit
applicable to the obligation); id. § 1747.50 (requires credit card issuers to correct bill-
ing errors within sixty days upon request); id. § 1747.90 (subjects credit card issuer to
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these and other efforts designed for his education and protection, the
average consumer continues to be subjected to countless fraudulent
and unfair business practices.5
It is estimated that these fraudulent practices result in the bilking
of the American public of a sum approaching one billion dollars per
year.6 In addition to these individual financial losses, consumer fraud
exacts broader and potentially more serious costs from society as a
whole. The prevalence of such fraud tends to undermine ethical busi-
ness standards. 7  A probable additional cost was cited by the Kerner
Commission, which stated that such exploitative practices as high pres-
sure salesmanship, bait advertising, misrepresentation of prices, substi-
tution of used goods for promised new ones, failure to notify consumers
of legal actions against them, refusal to repair or replace substandard
goods, and exorbitant prices were among the factors to which ghetto
rioting was at least partially attributable.,
There exists no evidence that the motives of the architects of the
current consumer protection system were anything but well-intentioned.
defenses of cardholder as buyer against retailer on purchases exceeding fifty dollars);
id. §§ 1750-84 (codifies the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, which delineates private
legal remedies for fraudulent business practices); id. § 1804.2 (subjects assignee of
seller's rights to all equities and defenses of the buyer against the seller arising out of
the sale and existing in favor of the buyer at the time of the assignment, any agree-
ment to the contrary notwithstanding); id. § 3370.1 (imposes civil penalty of up to
$2500 for unfair competition, including fraudulent business practices and deceptive ad-
vertising); CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 117 (West Supp. 1973) (increases jurisdiction
of Small Claims Court from maximum of $300 to $500); CAL. VEH. CODE ANN.
§ 5906.5 (West Supp. 1973) (requires recordation of odometer reading upon transfer
of motor vehicles).
5. In California, the sheer bulk of complaints and inquiries lodged with public and
private agencies illustrates the extent of the problem. For instance, it has been esti-
mated that the San Francisco Better Business Bureau received inquiries from con-
sumers at the rate of 140 per day with the total incidents of service approaching
63,000 for the year. Telephone conversation with Leo Harth, Director of Trade Prac-
tices, San Francisco Better Business Bureau, February 23, 1973. In the same year, the
Long Beach Better Business Bureau received a total of 49,650 inquiries, 2,865 of which
resulted in written complaints. Telephone conversation with Ben Paris, President and
General Manager, Long Beach Better Business Bureau, February 16, 1973. In addi-
tion, the California Attorney General's Office currently receives in excess of 1,000
written and 2,500 telephone complaints each month. Petitioner's Brief for Hearing be-
fore the California Supreme Court at 24, People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283,
507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief].
6. Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs
for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 395 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Translating Sym-
pathy].
7. See text accompanying note 36 infra.
8. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvisoRY COMM'N ON CiV.. DIsoRDERS 276 (1968).
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However, if, as has been asserted, up to 95% of illegal consumer
abuses escape adjudication, 9 it would seem safe to conclude that our
system has failed to provide truly adequate protection for the con-
sumer.
This Comment will examine the reasons for this failure by study-
ing the present state of consumer protection law in California. It will
be shown that for a variety of legal, social and economic reasons pri-
vate remedies,' 0 whether pursued through an individual or a class ac-
tion, do not afford the consumer a sufficiently adequate means by which
to redress injuries suffered as result of unfair or fraudulent business
practices. The recently enacted Consumers Legal Remedies Act
may have the potential for solving at least some of these problems;
however, as will be demonstrated, the Act leaves untouched certain
obstacles with respect to the initiation and maintenance of consumer
actions'" and certain insufficiencies within the Act itself may serve to
undermine the effectiveness of some of its most salutary provisions.' 8
Finally, this Comment will attempt to establish that the best hope for
providing the public with effective redress for consumer wrongs lies
chiefly with those actions which can be brought by the Attorney Gen-
eral, and therefore that office must continue to be assured maximum
power to effectively challenge unfair business practices if the con-
sumer's protection is to be truly whole.
9. Tydings, Fair Play for Consumers, TRIAL, Feb.-Mar., 1970, at 37, quoting
Ralph Nader testimony, Hearings on S. 1980 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
the Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. -
(1969).
10. No attempt will be made herein to discuss in detail the various specific causes of
action (see note 14 infra) available to the consumer injured by unfair or fraudulent
business practices or the specific problems which may arise in connection with the
prosecution of a particular cause of action. Rather, this Comment will attempt to
provide an overview of the general effectiveness of private as opposed to public reme-
dies for the redress and future deterrence of such practices. For discussions of the
various problems which may arise in connection with a particular cause of action, see
Hester, supra note 3, at 835-50 (problems related to a contract action for recission
including discussions of the effects of the parole evidence rule, puffing, the innocent
principal, and affirmance of contract), 850-59 (problems related to a contract action
for damages); 860-74 (problems related to recovery for misrepresentation on a tort
theory); Note, Disclaimers of Warranties in Consumer Sales, 77 HAv. L. REv. 318
(1963) (problems posed by disclaimers of warranties in commercial transactions).
See generally Traylor, Consumer Protection Against S ellers' Misrepresentations, 20
MERCER L. REv. 414 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Traylor].
11. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-84 (West Supp. 1973).
12. See text ac.companying notes 14-46 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 58-69, 104-08, 113-17 infra.
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PRIVATE REMEDIES
A. Common Impediments to the Effective Utilization of Private
Remedies, Whether through Individual or Class Actions
Private consumer actions to redress injuries suffered as a result of
fraudulent or unfair business practices may take the form of either
individual or class actions.14 However, irrespective of the type of ac-
tion brought, a number of considerations militate against the general
efficacy of the consumer litigant's suit. Some of these involve prob-
lems sui generis to the particular cause of action,'" while others are
inherent in any legal action undertaken by a private party.
An obvious preliminary to the seeking of redress by an individual
who has been the victim of a fraud is the individual's awareness that
he has been wronged. Seldom, however, does the defrauded consumer
actually possess this essential awareness. This consumer incognizance
is largely attributable to the commercial actualities which govern the
consummation of sales in the modern marketplace. 6 The consumer is
faced with a barrage of advertisements from distant sellers with whom
he is often totally unfamiliar. It is difficult to distinguish actionable
misrepresentation from "puffing" or mere opinion, which is deemed
not actionable within the context of the marketplace.'7  In many in-
stances, prepackaging prevents the buyer from examining the product
prior to purchase.18  Even in those situations in which the average
consumer is able to inspect the product, the technical knowledge nec-
essary to exercise an informed consumer judgment is ordinarily beyond
his competence. Further, the consumer often buys without comparing
or even considering the selling price.'9 Finally, the problem is further
aggravated by purchasing incentives, such as shopping for status and
14. Whether filed as an individual or class action the claim for relief may be
pleaded in contract for recission or damages, in tort for damages, under Business and
Professions Code section 17535 for restitution and injunctive relief (false advertising),
under Civil Code section 1780 for injunctive relief and actual and punitive damages
(use or employment of practices declared unlawful by section 1770), or on the theory
that the transaction constituted an illegal bargain, the enforcement of which is pro-
hibited on public policy grounds. Hester, supra note 3, at 866.
15. See note 10 supra.
16. Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, 54 IowA L.
REv. 319, 324 (1968). 1 -1
17. See Hester, supra note, 3, at 840-44. See also Traylor, supra note 10, at
420-21.
18. See Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, 54 IowA
L. REv. 319, 324 (1968).
19. See Comment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.L 745, 767 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Consumer Legislation].
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the widespread use of games and contests, which tend to focus the con-
sumer's attention on things other than the quality of the product pur-
chased.2°
While increased consumer education would seem to afford a po-
tentially effective method of alleviating the purchaser's lack of aware-
ness, experience has shown that the average consumer generally fails
to utilize those educational materials that are available to him. As
might be assumed, the better educated and more affluent segment of
the public, since it is better able to afford and comprehend available
educational materials, is generally better equipped to make intelligent
choices in the marketplace.21 However, the wealthy, as a group, have
apparently chosen not to make use of these sources to any significant
degree. Indeed, there appears to be little difference between the buy-
ing habits of the rich and those of the poor. Consumers in general,
regardless of class, tend to shop without comparing prices, fail to ap-
preciate the cost of credit and shop for status or to take advantage of
games and contests rather than for value.
22
Whereas the wealthy may choose not to utilize available informa-
tion regarding product and merchant reliability, the less affluent are,
more often than not, either unaware of the existence of the sources of
such information or unable to afford them. In one survey conducted
among the poor, 64% of those interviewed were unable to name any
public or private agency which could render assistance should they be
faced with a consumer problem.2  Of those who were able to name an
agency, more than one half identified the Better Business Bureau as their
prime source of assistance when faced with a fraudulent business prac-
tice.24 Certain factors, however, militate against the Bureau's effective-
ness in providing the consumer with adequate information or redress-
ing grievances. Requests for information concerning a given company
result merely in a disclosure of the number of complaints registered
against the company; the Bureau will not disclose the content of these
complaints,25 even though the contents will usually be the source of
the most meaningful information.20 If the Bureau is not contacted
20. Id.
21. A recent study, for example, has shown that of those who read Consumer Re-
ports, one of the few objective sources of product information, 79% have a college
background and 63% hold professional or managerial positions. Warne, Impact of
Consumerism on the Market, 8 SAN DIEGO L. Rlv. 30, 31 (1971).
22. Consumer Legislation, supra note 19, at 767-68.
23. Caplovitz, Consumer Problems, 23 LEGAL Am BIEF 143, 147 (1965).
24. Id.
25. Translating Sympathy, supra note 6, at 404-05.
26. Id. at 405.
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until after a fraud has taken place, the agency's only remedial power is
to seek a voluntary resolution of the problem. Finally, it is worth
noting that the Bureau is supported entirely through dues and mem-
bership fees of member merchants. 2  For these reasons, the extent to
which the Bureau may serve as an effective source of protection for
the low income consumer is indeed minimal.
2 9
Even assuming the consumer is able to recognize that he has been
defrauded, he may still be unaware of the legal remedies available to
him:
Most laymen lack more than a superficial knowledge of their rights and
liabilities in a post-sale legal conflict, and rely on professional help when
conflicts arise. Many low income consumers lack even this superficial
knowledge, and of the substantial number who feel that they have at
one time or another been cheated by a merchant, few have ever sought
professional aid-only 9 percent in a recent survey.30
The general lack of consumer education is simply one specific exam-
ple of the fact that public education with respect to the functioning of
our legal system is, unfortunately, of a rather general and informal na-
ture. An additional factor, more prevalent among the less affluent, is
a general reluctance to become involved in any manner with the legal
process. This reluctance on the part of the poor is largely derived
from a general lack of exposure to that process through other than un-
pleasant experiences.31 If an irate consumer does take action, it most
often takes the form of self-help, usually accomplished by the stoppage
of payment on a check or cessation of payment on a debt. Such ac-
tion, however, only worsens the consumer's position 2 since it often
subjects him to the invocation of legal' sanctions by the merchant.3
Be he rich or poor, the consumer's failure to know his legal rights
can have serious ramifications. Aside from the obvious costs in eco-
nomic loss and inconvenience to the individual, lack of knowledge of
legal rights prevents utilization of legislation specifically designed for
27. Id.
28. Id. at 404.
29. Id. at 404-05.
30. Consumer Legislation, supra note 19, at 752-53.
31. The attitude of the poor toward legal institutions is derived largely from poor
experiences with the law. Education concerning the legal process is informal. The
poor's principal acquaintance with the law is usually connected with experiences preg-
nant with oppression, abuse and frustration. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures
and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 BOSTON U.L. REv. 559, 568
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Rice].
32. Consumer Legislation, supra note 19, at 764.
33. Caplovitz, Consumer Problems, 23 LEGAL Am BREEF 143, 146 (1965).
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the protection of consumers generally. For instance, the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act, 4 which provides for damages and injunctive relief
at the behest of individual consumers for certain enumerated fraudulent
practices,3 5 cannot achieve its laudatory objectives if the public is un-
aware of its existence. Failure to be aware of and to utilize existing
remedies can also undermine ethical standards of business:
If each is left to assert his rights alone if and when he can, there will at
best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all.
This result is not only unfortunate in the particular case, but it will op-
erate seriously to impair the deterrent effect of the sanctions which un-
derline much contemporary law.
36
In those instances in which a class action is impracticable or
otherwise undesirable, another major factor which often prevents the
private litigant from pursuing an action for the redress of injury caused
34. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1750-84 (WestSupp. 1973).
35. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1770 (West Supp. 1973) provides:
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which
results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer are unlawful:
(a) Passing off goods or services as those of another.
(b) Misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods
or services.
(c) Misrepresenting the affiliation, connection, or association with, or certifi-
cation by, another.
(d) Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in con-
nection with goods or services.
(e) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteris-
tics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a
person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he
does not have.
(f) Representing that goods are original or new if they have deteriorated un-
reasonably or are altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand.
(g) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of an-
other.
(h) Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or mis-
leading representation of fact.
(i) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.
(j) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expect-
able demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity.
(k) Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning reasons for, ex-
istence of, or amounts of price reductions.
(1) Representing that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obli-
gations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law.
(m) Representing that a part, replacement, or repair service is needed when it
is not.
(n) Representing that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accord-
ance with a previous representation when it has not.
(o) Representing that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other
economic benefit, if the earning of the benefit is contingent on an event
to occur subsequent to the consummation of the transaction.
(p) Misrepresenting the authority of a salesman, representative, or agent to
negotiate the final terms of a transaction with a consumer.
36. Kalvin and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cmr.
L REv. 684, 686 (1941).
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by a fraudulent or unfair business practice is the cost involved in pro-
curing legal counsel. If the consumer has lost only one or two hun-
dred dollars as the result of such a practice, he will usually be unable
to secure an attorney to represent him. The cost of the extensive dis-
covery usually required in such cases would, alone, be likely to consume
any potential recovery.37  Furthermore, even if the consumer's claim
were more substantial and assuming that he could recover his court costs
and attorney's fees from the defendant if he should prevail, the highly
speculative nature of the consumer action38 would dissuade many at-
torneys from arranging for compensation on a contingency basis. Even
the abbreviated procedures of the small claims court, where the services
of an attorney are not required, have failed to materially help the con-
sumer's position due to the widespread abuse and circumvention of these
very procedures.3 9 The unscrupulous merchant, being well aware of
the difficulties experienced by the consumer in securing an attorney,
will tend to avoid practices which could result in losses sufficient to make
an attorney's services economically feasible.40 Other merchants simply
treat the loss of an occasional small claim as one of the risks of the trade,
a risk made worthwhile by continued high profits resulting from mis-
representation or deceit.41
Because it is difficult for the defrauded consumer to secure the
services of an attorney, legal aid services are increasingly called upon
to provide legal assistance. However, such services do not currently
have the ability to meet the need.42 The magnitude of the problem
becomes readily apparent upon viewing the available statistics. It has
been estimated that the number of persons qualifying for free legal
services in California is probably about 5,700,000."a This figure
37. The factors necessitating extensive discovery in a consumer fraud case may
include the consumer's inability to remember the representations made, the parties
present, or the documents signed.
38. The factors mentioned in note 37 supra as necessitating extensive discovery
also reduce the certainty of recovery. In addition, the fact that consumers tend to be
easily swayed by high pressure salesmanship further complicates the consumer's plight.
39. See generally Comment, Small Claims Courts and the Poor, 42 S. CAL. L. REv.
493, 496-99 (1969).
40. Translating Sympathy, supra note 6, at 409.
41. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
42. Legal Aid Attorneys in 33 offices averaged 1,678 cases in 1964 and in only
twenty-five of seventy offices surveyed did the average fall below 1,000. Contrast this
with the fact that half of the lawyers in private practice in New York handled not
more than 50 cases a year and only two percent took more than 500 cases. Note,
Neighborhood Law Offices: The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HAv.
L. REv. 805, 807 (1967).
43. According to the 1970 Census, there were 2,282,990 welfare recipients in Cal-
1973]
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should be read in light of the fact that of the 31,523 active members
of the California State Bar in 1970,44 there were a total of 325 legal
service program attorneys in California. 45  Short of a substantial in-
crease in governmental assistance, legal service programs will likely
continue to be unable to adequately assist the defrauded consumer in
obtaining relief.
While the above examples are by no means exhaustive, they are
illustrative of the kind of general problems which hinder the institution
of private suits for the redress of consumer grievances. Unfortunately,
the recently adopted Consumers Legal Remedies Act,40 which has the
potential for alleviating many of the problems associated with achiev-
ing redress for consumer wrongs, does not address itself to resolution
of these types of general problems. The Act merely adopts a lib-
eralized remedial scheme in an effort to enhance the position of the
wronged consumer who has been able to overcome the above obstacles.
Given this purpose, it becomes necessary to explore the extent to which
the provisions of the Act are likely to materially increase the overall
efficacy of private remedies as a means of redress for and future de-
terrence of unfair or fraudulent business practices.
The Consumers Legal Remedies Act, which became operative on
January 1, 1971,4 7 provides that if a consumer experiences any of the
sixteen specific unfair or deceptive acts or practices enumerated there-
in,48 he may bring suit to obtain actual damages, injunctive relief,
punitive damages or such other relief as the court may deem proper.40
Such suit may be maintained on either an individual 0 or class' basis.
The intention of the Act's draftsmen was succinctly stated by then
Assemblyman James A. Hayes in testimony before the Assembly Ju-
ifornia. PUBLIC WELFARE IN CALIFORNIA, Statistical Series PA 3-141 (1971). It has
been estimated by legal service attorneys that, since no more than 40% of their
clients receive welfare assistance, the number of those qualifying for free legal services
in California is close to 5,700,000. Brief for the Western Center on Law and
Poverty and California Legal Assistance, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 4, People v. Superior
Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Ct. of App. 1972).
44. Crowe, Annaal Report of the Board of Governors, 45 CAL. ST. B.J. 601, 602
(1970).
45. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, DIRECrORY, OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVICES,
REGION IX (San Francisco 1972).
46. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1750-84 (West Supp. 1973).
47. Id. § 1756.
48. For a listing of the unfair or deceptive acts or practices covered by the Act,
see note 35 supra.
49. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1780(a) (West Supp. 1973).
50. Id. § 1780.
51. Id. § 1781.
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diciary Committee: "It [the Consumers Legal Remedies Act] repre-
sents an extended and thorough effort to arrive at legislation which will
give consumers in this state much needed remedies against deceptive
practices in the market-place . *... ,52 It should be noted that the Act
was the product of extended negotiations between members of the leg-
islature, representatives of the business community and representatives
of the consumer movement. 5  Needless to say, these groups had sub-
stantially divergent views as to the purpose and implementing provi-
sions of the Act.54  It is the opinion of this author that the compromise
which resulted from a balancing of the respective interests of these fac-
tions leans too heavily toward the merchants' point of view. In an ef-
fort to assure that the Act would not "needlessly encourage frivolous
and harassing law suits against legitimate businessmen,"" the legis-
lature has enacted a statute which may have considerably less benefi-
cial impact in the area of consumer remedies than was intended. One
commentator, with firsthand knowledge of the legislative maneuvering
which preceded the Act, has recognized that due to the ambiguities
and insufficiencies of the statute "[ulskilled attorneys or unimaginative
judges could effectively destroy the utility of the legislation."5 6 Many
of the problems inherent in the Act are equally applicable to both
individual and class actions. The discussion which follows will serve
to illustrate certain of these problems.
57
A common law action to redress injury suffered as a result of a
deceptive business practice is usually brought on a theory of general
fraud.5 8  A traditional prerequisite to the success of such an action is
proof that the merchant intentionally defrauded the consumer.59 Since
52. See the testimony of Assemblyman Hayes before the Assembly Judiciary Com-
mittee on May 25, 1970, reproduced in Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An In-
sider's Analysis of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAC. L.J. 1, 7 n.21 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Reed].
53. Reed, supra note 52, at 8.
54. Obviously, consumer groups were interested in legislation which afforded the
public the strongest possible protection while business interests, fearful of the possible
adverse financial consequences of such legislation, championed a watered-down version
of the Act. See generally Reed, supra note 52, at 6-8.
55. See the testimony of Assemblyman Hayes in Reed, supra note 52, at 7 n.21.
56. Reed, supra note 52, at 2.
57. Problems inherent in the Act but unique to the class action are discussed in the
text accompanying notes 104-17 infra.
58. See Reed, supra note 52, at 5.
59. Cardozo v. Bank of America, 116 Cal. App. 2d 833, 837, 254 P.2d 949, 951
(1953); Wishnick v. Frye, 111 Cal. App. 2d 926, 930, 245 P.2d 532, 534 (1952).
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1709 (West 1970) provides: "One who wilfully deceives another
with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any
19733
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a merchant's intent can usually be proved only through utilization of
circumstantial evidence, 60 this requirement of proof of intent poses a
substantial problem to the consumer litigant.6 1  Thus, one of the chief
advantages of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act would seem to be
its apparent elimination of the requirement of proof of scienter, i.e.,
that the seller had knowledge of the falsity of his representation. 02 Al-
though the Act does not expressly disavow the scienter requirement,
the absence of any language specifically requiring proof of intent
would seem to imply that such proof is not required in order to suc-
cessfully maintain an action under the Act."3
However, section 1784 of the Act could indirectly result in the re-
imposition of the very scienter requirement which the Act's draftsmen
apparently sought to eliminate. This section, added at the request of
business representatives,6 4 provides that no award of damages may be
given for any violation under the Act if the following requirements are
met:
[If the person alleged to have employed or committed such method,
act, or practice (a) proves that such violation was not intentional and
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the use of reasonable
procedures adopted to avoid any such error and (b) makes an appropri-
ate correction, repair or replacement or other remedy of the goods and
services .... 65
damage which he thereby suffers." (Emphasis added). See generally Hester, supra
note 3, at 860.
60. Reed, supra note 52, at 5.
61. Id.
62. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1780(a) (West Supp. 1973) provides:
Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by
any person of a method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770
may bring an action......
It is to be noted that in contrast with section 1709 (see note 59 supra), where proof of
intent to deceive is required, under section 1780 no such showing is necessary. How-
ever, even the elimination of scienter as an element of the cause of action under sec-
tion 1786 merely follows the trend of previous California decisional law which ap-
pears to have already substantially lessened the plaintiff's burden of proving scienter as
a prerequisite for recovery on a general fraud theory. See Gagne v. Bertran, 43
Cal. 2d 481, 487, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954):
To be actionable deceit, the representation need not be made with knowledge of
actual falsity, but need only be an "assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true,
by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true." (Citations
omitted).
Accord, De Zemplen v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 221 Cal. App. 2d 197, 34
Cal. Rptr. 334 (1963). See generally 2 WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
TORTS § 198 et seq. (7th ed. 1960).
63. See notes 59 & 62 supra and note 67 infra.
64. Reed, supra note 52, at 20.
65. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1784 (West Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
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Although the burden of establishing the factors delineated in section
1784 is on the defendant, 66 the absence of any specific provision in
the Act expressly refuting the scienter requirement could enable a
court, if it so desired, to seize upon the reference to intent in section
1784 and twist it into a requirement that intent be alleged as an ele-
ment of the cause of action for any deceptive practice set forth in
section 1770.07
Although the Act was designed to augment the private litigant's reme-
dies, 8 it failed to include a provision making unlawful any trade
practice which is oppressive or otherwise unconscionable in any re-
spect, or which fails to comply with any state or federal consumer pro-
tection statute. This omission takes on added significance in view of
the fact that California, in adopting its version of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, refused to enact an "unconscionability" provision simi-
lar to section 2-302 of the Uniform Code. 69 As a result of the ab-
66. Id.
67. That such an interpretation would be a twisting of the statutory language should
be fairly clear. It is hard to conceive of section 1784 as anything but an affirmative
defense, as its title indicates. It can only be invoked if the defendant establishes each
of the following requirements: (1) the violation was not intentional, (2) it occurred
as a result of a bona fide error, (3) reasonable procedures had been used to avoid any
such error and (4) the violation has been remedied. A showing that the violation was
unintentional will not in itself absolve the defendant from liability under sections 1770
and 1780-the other three prerequisites must be satisfied as well. In fact, the inclu-
sion of a showing of no intent as one of the four prerequisites to an affirmative de-
fense under section 1784, if it is to have any interpretive significance at all, should
serve to resolve in favor of the plaintiff the ambiguity concerning intent as a require-
ment in sections 1770 and 1780. If intent were already embodied as an element of
plaintiff's cause of action, there would be no need to refer to it in section "1784.
Furthermore, it should be noted that section 1784, by its very terms, is not even a
complete defense to the plaintiff's cause of action. The fourth prerequisite demands
that the defendant make "an appropriate correction, repair or replacement or other
remedy of the goods and services" before he will be absolved of liability for damages.
In addition, the plaintiff is apparently not precluded from seeking injunctivo relief.
68. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1760 (West Supp. 1973) describes the statutory purp9se:
This title shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying pur-
poses, which are to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business prac-
tices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such pro-
tection.
See also text accompanying note 52 supra.
69. Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the con-
tract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
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sence of such a provision in California law, any fraudulent practice,
no matter how aggravated, must be attacked on pre-Act grounds if it is
not specifically enumerated in section 1770 of the Act.. Narrow in-
terpretations of the section 1770 categories, therefore, could deprive
many consumers of the benefit of the advantages conferred by the Act.
Thus, although the Consumers Legal Remedies Act does have
the potential for enhancing consumer litigants' legal position, the reali-
zation of this potential is conditioned upon a number of factors. Not
only must the consumer be aware that he has been the victim of a
fraud, have knowledge of his legal remedies and be able to procure
legal counsel, but in order to gain the full benefit of the Act he must
also rely upon favorable judicial construction of its provisions. It is
far from certain that any, let alone all, of these preconditions can be
met in any given case.
B. Problems Specifically Related to the Utilization of the
Class Action Form of Private Remedy
When faced with an unfair or deceptive business practice which
has caused loss to a number of consumers, those defrauded may
choose to pool their claims and bring a single action on behalf of the
entire group.70 A class action has been said to constitute a form of
organized pressure analogous to "mass demonstrations of the streets
. . . [the success of which] often hinges . . . .on the publicity, visibil-
ity and aroused popular reaction it evokes."' 1  The chief advantages of
the class action in the consumer context have been outlined by the
California Supreme Court as follows:
Frequently numerous consumers are exposed to the same dubious
practice by the same seller so that proof of the prevalence of the practice
as to one consumer would provide proof for all. Individual actions by
each of the defrauded consumers is often impracticable because the
amount of individual recovery would be insufficient to justify bringing a
separate action; thus an unscrupulous seller retains the benefits of its
wrongful conduct. A class action by consumers produces several salu-
tary by-products, including a therapeutic effect upon those sellers who
indulge in fraudulent practices, aid to legitimate business enterprises
by curtailing illegitimate competitioii, and avoidance to the judicial proc-
70. The Role of California's Attorney General and District Attorneys in Protecting
the Consumer, 4 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 35, 39 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Protecting
the Consumer].
71. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 11: Considerations of Procedure, 49
BOSTON U.L. RFv. 407, 408 (1969).
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ess of the burden of multiple litigation involving identical claims. The
benefit to the parties and the courts would, in many circumstances, be
substantial.
72
While these advantages may serve to minimize some of the prob-
lems associated with the utilization of private remedies for the redress
of consumer wrongs, they by no means totally alleviate such prob-
lems. For example, although the class action may, as a result both of
attempts to notify members of the class and of any publicity attendant
to the action itself, call the attention of certain consumers to wrongs
suffered and existent remedies of which they might otherwise be un-
aware, the efficacy of the class action as a means of general consumer
education is necessarily limited. Ordinarily, any publicity concerning
the class action will have the desired salutary effect only upon those
actually notified as potential members of the class or those who may
happen to read any newspaper articles or published announcements
describing the action.
In addition, however, to the problems inherent in the pursuit of
private remedies generally, whether on an individual or class basis,
further impediments to effective consumer utilization of the class action
arise in connection with the requirements for maintenance of such an
action.
Prior to the adoption of section 1781 of the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act,73 section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided
the sole authority for the maintenance of class actions in California.
Section 382 provides in relevant part:
[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many
persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to
bring them all before the Court, one or more may sue or defend for the
benefit of all.74
72. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808, 484 P.2d 964, 966-67, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 800-01 (1971). In this case 37 named consumers who had entered into
contracts for the purchase of meat and freezers brought a class action on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated against seller's assignee, to rescind said
contracts on the ground that the seller had fraudulently misrepresented the true facts
regarding the value and durability of the goods to be supplied. Id. at 805, 484 P.2d at
966, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 798. The California: Supreme Court, in vacating the decision of
the trial court, held that plaintiff's complaint alleged the requisite elements of a class
action as delineated in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). 4 Cal. 3d at 805, 484 P.2d at 966, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
The Daar case is discussed in the text accompanying notes 82-92 infra.
73. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (West Supp. 1973). See text accompanying notes 93-97
infra.
74. CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 382 (West 1970).
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The California courts' interpretation of this section has undergone
substantial change in the years since its enactment. Originally, the
courts construed the statute quite narrowly.75 Generally, a class ac-
tion was not permitted unless the person bringing suit and the mem-
bers of the potential class were so united in interest as to make them
necessary parties to the action."6 This requirement was in accord
with the weight of authority in the United States at the time, which
tended to restrict the use of the class action to cases where joinder
would otherwise be compulsory. 77 However, by tying the class suit
to a showing that each member of the class was a necessary party to
the action, the courts ignored the fact that the class suit was a product
of their equitable jurisdiction, 8 a fact which would seem to require a
more flexible and liberal reading of section 3 82.79
Despite its inconsistency with the nature of the class action gen-
erally, the compulsory joinder test persisted in some California courts
until 1948 when the California Supreme Court finally expressly dis-
avowed the test in Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses. 0 How-
ever, although the Weaver court strongly asserted that section 382 does
not require that class members be strictly united in interest,"' it failed
to indicate or provide any guidelines as to the kind of showing which
would be required to qualify for the maintenance of a class action un-
der the statute. It was not until Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,8 2 some
twenty years later, that the California Supreme Court squarely con-
fronted this issue.
75. See Carey v. Brown, 58 Cal. 180 (1881); Watson v. Santa Carmelita Mut.
Water Co., 58 Cal. App. 2d 709, 137 P.2d 757 (1943); Ballin v. L.A. County Fair,
43 Cal. App. 2d 884, 111 P.2d 753 (1941). But see Mitchell v. Pacific Greyhound
Lines, 33 Cal. App. 2d 53, 91 P.2d 176 (1939); Jellen v. O'Brien, 89 Cal. App. 505,
264 P. 1115 (1928). For a full discussion of the above cases, see Comment,
Class Actions and Interpleader: California Procedure and the Federal Rules, 6 STAN.
L. REv. 120, 124-33 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Class Actions].
76. Carey v. Brown, 58 Cal. 180, 183-84 (1881). In so requiring, the courts in-
terpreted the "common or general interest" phrase of Code of Civil Procedure section
382 in light of the first clause of that section which provides: "Of the parties to the
action, those who are united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs .... " CAL,
CODE oF CIv. PROc. § 382 (West 1968) (emphasis added).
77. See Class Actions, supra note 75, at 122.
78. Id. at 121-22.
79. Id. at 122. The essentially equitable nature of the class action was recognized
by the English Courts which appear to have never applied rigid rules to the class suit,
Id.
80. 32 Cal. 2d 833, 841, 198 P.2d 514, 519 (1948).
81. Id.
82. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
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In Daar a suit was brought by an individual taxicab passenger on
behalf of himself and all other users to recover excessive charges as-
sessed by the taxicab company over a four-year period. 83 The ques-
tion which faced the court in Daar was whether the facts as set out in
the complaint were sufficient to meet the requirements of section
382.84 The California courts had over the years evolved two prerequi-
sites to the maintenance of a class suit under section 382: the existence
of (1) an ascertainable class and (2) a well-defined community of in-
terest in the questions of law and fact involved which affect the parties
to be represented. 5 The principal issue in Daar was whether the first
of these requirements had been met, i.e., whether the existence of an
ascertainable class had been sufficiently established. For, although
the identity of passengers who were purchasers of script books could
be ascertained from company records, the identity of those who paid
cash could not be so verified. 6 The court's solution was to merge
the ascertainable class requirement into the community of interest
test:87 "whether there is an ascertainable class depends in turn upon
the community of interest among the members in the questions of law
and fact involved." 88  Thus, the central consideration became simply
whether the members of the class had a sufficient community of in-
terest in the questions of law and fact involved to permit the mainte-
nance of the class action.89 By effectively eliminating the need to
identify the individual class members as a prerequisite to determining
the existence of an ascertainable class, the court carried the process of
freeing the class suit from arbitrary fixed rules one step further.
Applying its new and simplified test for the maintenance of a class
action to the case before it, the court concluded that the requisite
community of interest was indeed present.90 It noted that its views
were in substantial agreement with the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 91 However, it refused to es-
tablish any fixed rule as to what would constitute a "community of in-
terest." Instead it held that whether a community of interest exists
83. Id. at 699-700, 433 P.2d at 736, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
84. Id. at 703, 433 P.2d at 738, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
85. Id. at 704, 433 P.2d at 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 731.
86. See Reed, supra note 52, at 15.
87. Id.
88. 67 Cal. 2d at 706, 433 P.2d at 740, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 714, 433 P.2d at 746, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
91. Id. at 709, 433 P.2d at 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
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in a given case will depend .upon the facts and circumstances presented
therein.92
It is within this general context that the class action provisions93
of the recently enacted Consumers Legal Remedies Act should be con-
sidered. As has been noted above, the Act provides the consumer
with the right to bring an action for damages and injunctive relief for
certain enumerated fraudulent practices.94 Section 1781 of the Act
specifically entitles the consumer to bring a class action if the following
four conditions precedent are met:
(1) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the
court.
(2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially
similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual
members.
(3) The claims or defenses of the respresentative plaintiffs are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class.
(4) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.9 5
Thus, under section 1781, a community of interest would exist if the
questions of law or fact common to the class were substantially similar
and predominant" and i4 the claims of the representative plaintiffs
were typical of those of the class.97 Obviously, these requirements do
not establish rigid rules. Instead, they function as general guideposts
which merely indicate to potential litigants the considerations which
a court will find most compelling in deciding whether a class suit
should be permitted in a given case. These guideposts would appear
to be consistent with the principal thrust of Daar, in that their flexibil-
ity emphasizes and reinforces the equitable nature of the class suit.
The four factors specified in section 1781 are clearly applicable
to all class actions brought to remedy any of the fraudulent business
practices enumerated in the Consumers Legal Remedies Act. The
question remains whether the courts will apply these same factors in
resolving the community of interest question in consumer class actions
which fall outside the scope of the Act, and which must therefore be
brought as general section 382 class actions. 98 Although at this point
92. Id. at 710, 433 P.2d at 743, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
93. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1781 (West Supp. 1973).
94. See note 35 supra.
95. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1781(b) (West Supp. 1973).
96. Id. § 1781(b)(2).
97. Id. § 1781(b)(3).
98. See text accompanying notes 47-51, 68-69 supra.
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it is only possible to speculate, it would seem likely that the courts
will do so. The requirements established by section 1781 are nearly
identical to those set forth in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which were cited with approval by the Daar court.99 The
legislature was well aware of the Daar decision at the time it enacted
section 1781.100 It seems probable, therefore, that the factors deline-
ated in section 1781 were intended to incorporate and clarify the Daar
community of interest test.
A clue to the possible thinking of the courts can be gleaned from
the California Supreme Court's language in Vasquez v. Superior
Court:'01
If the class action is to prove a useful tool to the litigants and the court,
pragmatic procedural devices will be required to simplify the poten-
tially complex litigation while at the same time protecting the rights of
all the parties. Although we have concluded that the provisions of the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act do not apply retroactively to this case,
no valid reason exists to prevent the trial court from utilizing many of
the procedural provisions of the act in the interests of efficiency. 102
The courts could easily apply the section 1781 requirements by anal-
ogy in every class action.10 3 The application of these requirements
would result in increased uniformity in judicial approach to and analysis
of class actions whether brought under section 1781 or section 382.
Uniformity in result, however, may still vary depending upon the type
of class action brought, unless all of the attributes of the section 1781
form of action are deemed applicable and judicially adopted for sec-
tion 382 actions as well. For the outcome in actions brought under
section 1781 will depend on the ultimate resolution of certain cur-
rently unresolved questions arising under the Act.
One such question arises in connection with section 1781(c) of
the Act, which requires a, preliminary hearing to resolve certain ques-
tions incident to the bringing of a class action. 0 4 Under this section,
99. See text accompanying note 91 supra. For a general discussion of Rule 23(a),
see Rice, supra note 31, at 579-83.
100. See the testimony of Assemblyman Hayes before the Assembly Judiciary Com-
mittee on May 25, 1970, reproduced in Reed, supra note 52, at 7 n.21.
101. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
102. Id. at 820, 484 P.2d at 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
103. It is true that the Consumers Legal Remedies Act expressly states that the
remedies provided in the Act are not exclusive, but are "in addition to any other pro-
cedures or remedies provided in any other law." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1752 (West Supp.
1973). This admonition, however, would not preclude a court, if it so desired, from
utilizing the section 1781 requirements in the section 382 class action for the purpose
of determining the existence of a community of interest.
104. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1781(c) (West Supp. 1973).
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the court has the power to determine the propriety of the class, the
necessity for published notice, the merit of the action or the existence
of any defense to such action.' 0 5 The Act does not state what kind
of orders the court is to make as a result of its findings. It has been
argued that the courts should look to Rule 23(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for authority on this issue.' 0 6 Rule 23(c)
enables federal courts, in a preliminary hearing in actions brought on a
class action basis, to issue orders "which may be conditional and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.' 0 7  Thus,
if the federal experience were to be followed, the court in class actions
brought pursuant to section 1781 would only be able to issue condi-
tional orders and could not defeat the class action at an early stage.
Summary judgment pursuant to section 437c of the Code of Civil
Procedure seems to be clearly prohibited in actions brought under
section 1781.108 Nevertheless, the failure of the section to clarify the
courts' power at the preliminary hearing could easily result in the use
of the hearing as still another obstacle for consumers to overcome in
order to successfully maintain a class action.
Whatever the interrelationship between sections 382 and 1781,
there are a number of obstacles common to the bringing of any class
action which will continue to limit the effectiveness of the class action
as a vehicle for the redress of consumer grievances. To begin with,
for the successful maintenance of a class action, plaintiffs must estab-
lish the existence of common facts, i.e., in the defrauded consumer
context, that the misrepresentations made to each member of the class
were substantially identical. 00 This is the element which ties the class
together and it must be proven to establish the requisite "community
of interest.""10 Most successful class action suits involve simple factual
disputes. In Daar, for example, either the meters were rigged or they
were not."' The complaints of each member of the class were the
105. Id. The converse of section 1781(c) can be found in recent additions to the
Code of Civil Procedure which permit coordination of separate actions which share
a common question of law or fact, upon the motion of the judge or any party. Ch.
1162, § 2, [1972] Cal. Stat. - (codified at CODE OF Civ. PROC. H8 404-.8 (West
Supp. 1973)) (effective Jan. 1, 1974).
106. See Reed, supra note 52, at 16.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
108. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1781(c) (West Supp. 1973); CAL. CODE OF CIv. PROC.
§ 437c (West Supp. 1973). But see Reed, supra note 52, at 16.
109. Smit, Are Class Actions for Consumer Fraud a Fraud on the Consumer, 26
Bus. LAwYER 1053, 1064 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Smit].
110. Id.
111. 67 Cal. 2d at 701, 433 P.2d at 737, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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same. However, this is often not the case in consumer fraud situations.
Because there is often no way to document that the oral representa-
tions made to each member of the class were the same, class litigants
are frequently relegated to pleading that the representations constituted
a common plan or scheme, the actual existence of which is at best a
probability.': 2 It is also highly unlikely that a single private attorney
or firm will receive a sufficient number of identical complaints to even
suspect that the basis for the bringing of a class. action exists.
In addition, there exists the possibility that the serious due process
questions involved in utilization of class actions might develop into
substantial obstacles to their successful maintenance. A class action
will be res judicata as to all class issues adjudicated therein.113  If the
named plaintiffs in the suit fail to prove their case, absent members of
the class may be prevented from bringing an action for recovery based
on the same facts, even if their claim of fraud could be more easily
proved." 4 Thus, it is essential to provide effective notice to all mem-
bers of the class if minimum due process requirements are to be met.
At present, however, there exists a degree of uncertainty as to the type
of notice necessary to satisfy the due process requirement. Section
1781(d) of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act does attempt to deal
with the problem. It provides that the court may appoint either party
to notify class members of the action." 5 Notice by publication is
permitted if personal notification would b impractical or unreasonably
expensive. 116 However, despite the care with which the statute was
written, it is impossible to be certain that the due process standards
set out in the statute will hold up under judicial scrutiny.'" At the
very least, it would seem that protracted litigation on the due process
question, if not a certainty, is a distinct possibility.
Another obstacle which the consumer must surmount in order to
maintain a class action involves the length of time required to litigate
a class suit." 8 The magnitude of the claim and the status of the de-
112. Smit, supra note 109, at 1062.
113. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 706, 433 P.2d 732, 740, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724, 732 (1967), wherein the court stated:
If we conclude that the instant complaint properly sets forth a class action, the
judgment herein will be res judicata as to all persons to whom the common ques-
tions of law and fact pertain.
114. See Smit, supra note 109, at 1066.
115. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1781(d) (West Supp. 1973).
116. Id.
117. See the discussion in Reed, supra note 52, at 16-17.
118. Daar, for example, was filed on November 20, 1964, but was not finally set-
tled until November, 1970. Smit, supra note 109, at 1063 n.35.
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fendant in the ordinary class action usually lead to a spirited defense
which in turn involves delays due to pleading challenges, discovery,
trial and appeals. In the interim, the consumer is denied restitution.
This can be especially serious when the person defrauded is poor. De-
lay also taxes the courts. Wile municipal and small claim courts
normally handle retail sales cases, superior courts will be forced to try
many of the aggregated individual claims. 119 The increased caseload
will further burden the already crowded court calendars.
Existing legislation which awards attorneys' fees to the party who
prevails in certain civil actions 20 also tends to complicate the bringing
of class actions in California. If the class loses and the defendant is
awarded attorneys' fees, which can be quite substantial, the absent
members as well as the named plaintiff would be forced to contribute
to the award.' 2' To add insult to injury, an unsuccessful class action
may have generated attorneys' fees in excess of any potential recov-
ery.' 2 2  The chance that the action might not succeed and that the
plaintiffs would therefore be saddled with high attorney costs tends to
discourage the bringing of suits in all but the most aggravated cases of
unfair or fraudulent practices.
The class action, then, whether brought pursuant to section 382
of the Code of Civil Procedure or section 1781 of the Civil Code, is
not necessarily the "ultimate" remedy some have lauded it to be.1
23
Like the private consumer remedies, the class suit suffers from existing
and potential problems. The Consumers Legal Remedies Act, as dis-
cussed above, subjects the class suit to potential new problems in
connection with the provision providing for preliminary hearings
24
and the section blocking any damage award if the defendant proves
that the harm caused was unintentional, resulted from a bona fide
error despite utilization of reasonable procedures adopted to avoid
such error, and has been "appropriately" remedied. 125  Additionally,
problems involved in the maintenance of any class action, namely, the
establishment of common facts, the question of notice (due process),
the length of litigation time, and the matter of attorneys' fees continue
119. Smt, supra note 109, at 1076.
120. CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 1811.1 (Retail Installment Sales Act) & 2983.4 (Automo-
bile Sales Financing Act) (West 1970).
121. Smit, supra note 109, at 1067.
122. Id.
123. See Protecting the Consumer, supfa note 70, at 39-42.
124. See text accompanying notes 104-08 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
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to pose substantial barriers to effective consumer utilization of the class
action as a means of redressing wrongs suffered.
126
The burden of combatting unfair business practices too often
falls in its entirety upon consumers lacking knowledge that they have
been wronged, an awareness of potential remedies, or the resources to
prosecute an action against the perpetrators of such practices. In
addition, the damages suffered as a result of such practices are usually
not substantial enought to provide the defrauded consumer with the
incentive to bring the matter to the attention of an attorney. Fur-
ther, the defrauded individual usually does not have the necessary
knowledge of others similarly defrauded to alert an attorney to the
possibilities of a class action. Even if an attorney does discover
grounds for the maintenance of such an action, the many economic,
procedural and substantive problems discussed above militate against
a quick and successfully concluded suit.
By contrast, the) Attorney General, because of his state-wide in-
formation gathering capabilities, is often able to recognize and isolate
recurring fraudulent practices. In addition, his financial and man-
power resources, while perhaps not fully adequate, do enable him to
bring successful suits in many cases in which private attorneys might
be unable or unwilling to do so. 127  It thus seems that if the often
stated public policy of assuring the consumer effective redress for con-
sumer wrongs is to ever be more than a partially fulfilled promise, it
is necessary that the Attorney General's power to assure the consumer
protection must be protected where sufficient and strengthened where
necessary.
PUBLIC REMEDIES: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S POWER
A. Injunctions and Civil and Criminal Penalties
In view of the substantial problems involved in securing relief
privately through individual or class actions, increasing attention is be-
ing focused on the role of the public-sector in assuring the consumer
adequate protection. The Attorney General's Consumer Fraud Unit,
founded in 1959, has the primary responsibility for seeing that state
laws concerning consumer protection are adequately enforced.'
2 8
126. See text accompanying notes 109-22 supra.
127. For a discussion of the factors considered by the Attorney General's Office in
initiating actions, see Comment, Project: The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical
Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 883, 958 n.304 (1968-69) [hereinafter cited as Project].
128. See Traylor, supra note 10, at 431.
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Each year the Attorney General's Office receives thousands of com-
plaints of misrepresentation and unfair competition. 12  Through utili-
zation of their powers to bring a number of different actions to redress
wrongs suffered by the consumer,130 the Attorney General and local
district attorneys have the potential for bringing concerted public ac-
tion to bear against unfair and fraudulent consumer practices. The
large number of complaints received by the Attorney General's Of-
fice"3 ' enables it to keep a finger on the pulse of the consumer situa-
tion in the state. It can assemble data on an area-wide basis and act
when a potentially harmful trend emerges. 132 The Office's investi-
gative resources and staff, although limited in both size and budget,
can nevertheless bring actions which many private litigants could not
afford.'
The Attorney General of the State of California has specific statutory
authority to bring actions for injunctive relief,'3 4 actions in which
civil penalties are sought, 3 5 and criminal prosecutions.13  Basically,
there are two sources of statutory authority for the seeking of in-
junctive relief by the Attorney General in cases involving unfair or
fraudulent business practices. Section 17500 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code makes it unlawful for "any person, firm, corporation or
association. . . to make or. . .cause to be made. . . any advertis-
ing device . . .or . . .any statement . . .which is untrue or mis-
leading. . . with the intent not to sell such. . . property or services
as so advertised."'3 7 Section 17535 of the same Code, insofar as is
relevant to the discussion herein, authorizes the Attorney General to
seek injunctive relief against the making of any untrue or misleading
statement in violation of section 17500.138 Section 3369 of the Civil
Code deals with "unfair competition" and includes within the defini-
tion, of that term "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act de-
nounced by Business and Professions Code Sections 17500 through
129. See note 5 supra.
130. See text accompanying notes 134-36 infra.
131. See note 5 supra.
132. Protecting the Consumer, supra note 70, at 43-45.
133. See generally Project, supra note 127, at 956-57.
134. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17535 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. Civ. CODn
§ 3369 (West 1970).
135. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17536 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3370.1 (West Supp. 1973).
136. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17534 (West 1964).
137. Id. § 17500.
138. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17535 (West Supp. 1973).
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17535."'1 9  Section 3369 also confers authority upon the Attorney
General or any district attorney in the state, upon their own com-
plaint or that of any board, officer, person, corporation or associa-
tion, to bring an action for injunction for violations of the section.140
California courts have construed the terms "misleading" and "un-
true," as used in section 17500, broadly.141 Generally, there is no
requirement of proof of intent to deceive, 142 actual deception, 143 irrep-
arable injury, 44 or any injury at all.' 45  Even a statement which is
technically true may be held to be "misleading" within the courts'
broad interpretation. 46 For example, in one case, 147 an advertisement
for chiropractic services invited the public to bring the ad to the
chiropractor's office within ten days. 48  Although no discount was
promised, the court held that the advertisement had a double meaning
in that it carried with it the implication that its presentation at the of-
fice within the specified period would result in a discount of some
139. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369 (West 1970).
140. Id. It should be noted that under section 3369, there need not even be actual
"competition" in order to support the granting of an injunction. For example, in
People ex rel Mosk v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516
(1962), the trial court had found that the defendant's acts-the mailing of informa-
tion blanks which directly simulated official governmental questionnaires, but which
were in fact ploys to obtain confidential information to facilitate debt collection-
constituted "unfair competition" within the scope of section 3369. Id. at 767-69, 20
Cal. Rptr. at 518-19. On appeal, defendants contended that section 3369 referred only
to the narrow field of business competition and, since the parties offended were not
in business, no violation of section 3369 had occurred. Id. at 769, 20 Cal. Rptr. at
519. The court of appeal, in rejecting this contention, held that section 3369 was
broad enough to include the acts of the defendant, the essential test being whether the
public was likely to be deceived. Id. at 772, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
141. See Project, supra note 127, at 961-62.
142. Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 555 (9th
Cir. 1960); People v. Lynam, 253 Cal. App. 2d 959, 965-66, 61 Cal. Rptr. 800, 805
(1967); People v. Wahl, 39 Cal. App. 2d 771, 773, 100 P.2d 550, 551 (1940).
143. See In re Application of O'Connor, 80 Cal. App. 647, 252 P. 730 (1927); 28
Op. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 277, 279 (1956).
144. See, e.g., Paul v. Wadler, 209 Cal. App. 2d 615, 625, 26 Cal. Rptr. 341, 347
(1962).
145. 29 Op. CAL. ATrY GEN. 175, 177-78 (1957). In determining that injury
need not be shown, California -has adopted the theory of the federal courts that
"... -when a legislative body has authorized the injunctive remedy for the violation
of the statute, it has determined as a matter of law that irreparable injury attends the
violation .... " Paul v. Wadler, 209 Cal. App. 2d 615, 625, 26 Cal. Rptr. 341, 347
(1962).
146. Garvai v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 216 Cal. App. 2d 374, 379, 31
Cal. Rptr. 187, 189 (1963).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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kind and was thus "misleading."' 49
Certain advantages adhere to the Attorney General's utilization
of actions for injunctive relief as opposed to other available forms of
action. For instance, as compared with a criminal prosecution, an
injunctive suit affords the Attorney General the right to subpoena
documents and business records without a court order.1 0 The power
to subpoena and discover enables the Attorney General to take full
advantage of interrogatories, depositions and requests for admis-
sion.'"' Not only does the availability and use of these devices save
valuable time, but they may also provide the Attorney General with
access to information which might otherwise have been difficult or
impossible to obtain. 52 In addition, in cases in which utilization of
the injunctive process proves successful, the Attorney General is as-
sured that the unfair or misleading practices in question will cease in
the future. 5 ' A further advantage lies in the inability of the defen-
dant to deny any fact necessarily determined in the injunction action
should it arise again in a subsequent suit brought by or against him.254
Through the use of this aspect of the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
the consumer can gain a decided advantage in any private action
against a defendant based on activities similar to those for which the
injunction was issued. 55 The existence of this doctrine also affords
149. Id.
150. CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 11180-82 (West 1970). Section 11181 (West
1970) provides that the Attorney General may:
(a) Inspect books and records.
(b) Hear Complaints.
(c) Administer oaths.
(d) Certify to all official acts.
(e) Issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of pa-
pers, books, accounts, documents and testimony in any inquiry, investiga-
tion, hearing or proceeding pertinent or material thereto in any part of the
State.
See generally Project, supra note 127, at 963.
151. Project, supra note 127, at 963.
152. Id.
153. See Protecting the Consumer, supra note 70, at 51.
154. Project, supra note 127, at 964.
This means that the facts determined in an injunctive suit brought against a seller
by the Attorney General will be binding upon the seller in any subsequent suit
by a consumer. Id.
155. Id. at 964-65.
Violation of an existing injunction provides the Attorney General with still another
powerful bargaining tool. For example, the Attorney General recently obtained
an agreement from an advertiser never to engage in that business in California
again. The defendant had been previously enjoined from selling advertisements in
what were supposed to be business directories with a large circulation. The vio-
lation of the injunction, which in California may be considered a misdemeanor or
contempt, allowed the Attorney General to name his own terms. Id. (citations
omitted).
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the Attorney General increased leverage in forcing the offending party
to agree to "stipulated injunctions," i.e., voluntary suspensions of the
fraudulent activities in lieu of institution of an action. 156
In addition to the power to seek injunctive relief, the Attorney
General has the statutory power to seek civil penalties for violations
of certain of the state's consumer laws. Section 17536 of the Business
and Professions Code provides, insofar as is relevant to the current
discussion, that any person who makes any untrue or misleading state-
ment in violation of Section 17500
shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hun-
dred dollars ($2500) for each violation, which shall be assessed and re-
covered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the State of
California by the Attorney General or by any district attorney in any
court of competent jurisdiction.157
Section 3370.1 of the Civil Code, enacted in 1972,158 adopts essen-
tially identical provisions in imposing a civil penalty for violation of
section 3369 of the Civil Code.'59 The California Supreme Court has
recently interpreted section 17536 as affording a single cause of action
for its violation, regardless of the number of misrepresentations made
or the number of victims involved.' 60 However, the court also held
that the amount of damages recoverable in any given action is depen-
dent on the number of violations committed and that the number of
violations is determined by the number of persons to whom misrepre-
sentations were made.' 6 ' Thus, potential fines could be quite large.
Although it is likely that the threat of a fine totalling twenty-five or
fifty thousand dollars might induce potentially unscrupulous sellers
156. For additional discussion on the mechanism of the stipulated injunction, whereby
the Attorney General accepts assurance of the discontinuance of the unlawful practice
in lieu of institution of an action, see id. at 964; see also Protecting the Consumer,
supra note 70, at 51.
157. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17536 (West Supp. 1973). The reasons
necessitating the enactment of section 17536 are summarized in CONTINUING EDUCATION
OF THE BAR, Ravmw OF SELECTED 1965 CODE LEGISLATION 21 (1965):
mhe injunction and misdemeanor provisions of the old law were not adequate
to stop false advertising rackets. . . . The guilty party keeps his gains and is
merely ordered not to defraud people in the same way again. Criminal prosecu-
tions are seldom undertaken because juries tend to be reluctant to apply criminal
sanctions to white-collar crimes and because it is difficult for outsiders to fix re-
sponsibility in . . . [the] . . . modern corporate structure.
158. Ch. 1084, § 2, [1972] Cal. Stat. - (codified at CAL. Civ. CODE § 3370.1
(West Supp. 1973)).
159. Id.
160. People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 288-89, 507 P.2d 1400, 1403-04, 107
Cal. Rptr. 192, 195-96 (1973).
161. Id.
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to at least consider the fairness and veracity of their promotional
schemes,162 it is too early to conclude that sections 17536 and 3370.1
constitute "nuclear weapons" in the war against consumer fraud. 103
In addition to seeking injunctions and civil penalties, the Attorney
General or any district attorney may bring criminal charges against
an individual guilty of violating consumer laws. 0 4  In the area of
consumer credit protection, the Retail Installment Sales Act'0 5 and the
Automobile Sales Finance Act 60 provide that any person who will-
fully violates any provision of either statute shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. 67  Criminal sanctions are also available for violation of
section 17500 of the Business and Professions Code.10 8  Violation of
an injunction issued to enjoin illegal business practices also consti-
tutes a misdemeanor. 69 However, the relatively minimal sentence or
fine attached to misdemeanor violations'7 militates against the effec-
tiveness of criminal prosecutions in preventing consumer fraud, for
the penalty simply will not deter the constantly dishonest business op-
erator.' 7 1  In addition, the time and manpower required to obtain
conviction in such cases has an extremely taxing effect upon the limited
resources of enforcement agencies. 72  Further, in those cases in which
a conviction is obtained, it is often the person least culpable who is
162. Kirby, Actions for False Advertising Under California Business and Professions
Code 17536: An Argument for Applying Civil Rules of Proof, 5 U.S.F.L. REv. 440,
44041 (1970). For an interesting argument that, in the spirit of efficiency and econ-
omy, the government should not be required to prove violations of § 17536 beyond
a reasonable doubt but should only have to carry the civil burden of proof, see id.
at 440-50.
163. In his article on the role of the San Diego District Attorney in the fight
against consumer fraud, M. James Lorenz described California Business and Profes-
sions Code section 17536 in conjunction with section 17500 as constituting just such a
"nuclear weapon." Certainly on the basis of the settlement of one section 17536 action
against a large chain store for $8,000, it would be an exaggeration to conclude that,
when threatened with the use of section 17536, officials of chain stores would "move
swiftly to discipline subordinates committing the offense complained of and make
sure the deceptive practices are curtailed." Lorenz, Consumer Fraud and the San
Diego District Attorney's Office, 8 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 47, 50-51 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Lorenz].
164. CAT.. Bus. & PROF. CODE_ ANN. § 17534 (West 1970).
165. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1801-12.1 (West Supp. 1973).
166. Id. H§ 2981-84.4.
167. Id. H9 1812.6 & 2983.6.
168. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17534 (West 1970).
169. CAL. PEN. CODE § 166.4 (West 1970).
170. Id. § 19.
171. Lorenz, supra note 163, at 50.
172. Project, supra note 127, at 959.
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punished. 7 3 It is probably for these reasons that only 5% of the cases
handled by the California Consumer Fraud Unit are criminal. 174 In-
deed, the chief advantage of the criminal remedy does not lie with the
actual convictions obtained thereunder, but with the fact that the At-
torney General or district attorney can use the threat of bringing
charges as an additional bargaining device in securing stipulated injunc-
tions.1 7
5
B. Restitution
In empowering the Attorney General to seek civil penalties, criminal
penalties and injunctions, the California State Legislature undoubtedly
sought to provide the Attorney General with a complete array of de-
vices with which to protect the consumer. However, mere passage of
legislation is meaningless if such legislation cannot be translated into a
workable program of truly effective protection of the consumer from
unfair and fraudulent business practices. The effectiveness of any
program will depend upon how completely the Attorney General is
able to rectify consumer wrongs through his use of the tools which the
legislature has placed at his disposal. While enjoining the unfair or
fraudulent practice through either a stipulated or litigated injunction
protects future customers, 76 it does nothing for those already de-
frauded. Similarly, criminal and civil penalties penalize the offender
by extracting a portion of the fraudulently obtained property and by
singling out the violator by way of example. However, these remedies
do no more for those already defrauded than does the injunction. 177
What is needed is a remedy which goes beyond mere stoppage of the
illegal act and punishment of the wrongdoer, a remedy which provides
for the compensation of parties already injured and which thus can be
utilized to "repair" the wrong done.' 78  Since, as this Comment has
attempted to demonstrate, consumer-initiated suits, whether collective
or individual, are largely unavailable or ineffective, the procurement
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Protecting the Consumer, supra note 70, at 53.
176. See text accompanying notes 153-56 supra.
177. It has been aptly pointed out that empowering the Attorney General to sue for
civil penalty or injunctive relief without providing him with the authority to gain resti-
tution on behalf of those parties actually defrauded results in the anomaly that the
Attorney General may actually benefit individual consumers more by obtaining volun-
tary discontinuance and reimbursement than by instituting litigation. Comment, Public
and Private Consumer Remedies in New York, 34 ALBANY L. Rlv. 326, 327-28
(1970).
178. See Rice, supra note 31, at 567.
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of a satisfactory and complete remedy will in many cases depend
upon the ability of the Attorney General to initiate actions in which
appropriate individual relief may be secured. He must be assured
the power not only to bring actions to enjoin or penalize a criminal
violation of a consumer law, but also, as an adjunct to such actions, to
compel the offender to restore the fraudulently obtained property.
Until recently,' 7 9 there existed no explicit statutory authority em-
powering the courts to order restitution in a suit brought by the At-
torney General, although he had always assumed that he could obtain
such relief.180 This assumption has now been vindicated by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in People v. Superior Court,18 which
vocated a court of appeal decision that had completely rejected the At-
torney General's contentions.' 2 The Attorney General had filed a
complaint charging that defendants had used false and misleading
statements and had engaged in other acts of unfair competition in their
scheme to sell encyclopedias and related services to members of the
public.' 8 3 The complaint sought civil penalties and exemplary damages
for false advertising. 8 4  In addition, an order was sought to compel
defendants to offer each customer who was solicited by a salesman using
an unlawful or fraudulent business presentation an opportunity to rescind
his contract, return the products and obtain a refund.'8 5 The court of ap-
peal, in affirming the trial court's ruling that the People had not stated
a cause of action for restitution, refused to permit the Attorney Gen-
eral to seek an order forcing the defendant to disgorge himself of the
illegally gained funds and to return such funds to the defrauded par-
ties. 86 The court rested its opinion upon the ground that the Attorney
General did not have a statutory action in restitution,' 87 and that, in
the absence of such an express provision, section 367 of the Code of
179. On June 30, 1972, Assembly Bill 1763 was signed into law amending California
Business and Professions Code section 17535 to provide courts with the specific power
to restore to any person in interest any money or property acquired through unfair or
fraudulent business practices. Ch. 244, § 1, [1972] Cal. Stat. -. Section 17535 as
amended will apply only to unfair or fraudulent business practices and therefore those
defrauded through violations of Civil Code section 3369 (unfair competition) are not
afforded any additional protection by the new provision. But cf. text accompany-
ing notes 243-46 infra.
180. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 5, at 16, 18-19 n.3.
181. 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973).
182. 100 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1972).
183. 9 Cal. 3d at 286, 507 P.2d at 1402, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
184. Id.
185. Id. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 5, at 12.
186. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 43-48.
187. Id. at 43-46.
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Civil Procedure would control.'18  Section 367 provides that every ac-
tion must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.8 9
The court stated that for the People to assert a restitutionary obliga-
tion, they would have to show that they constituted the real parties in
interest, i.e., the party to whom such obligation was owed.' 90 The court
held that the People had not made such a showing, since it was the de-
frauded parties and not the state which suffered the detriment.' 9 '
The court of appeal's decision was alarming because, had it been
affirmed, it would have drastically restricted the ability of the Attorney
General and courts of equity to utilize remedies which adequately pro-
vide relief to the injured consumer. The opinion itself was surprising
in two respects. First, it was inconsistent with a national and state at-
mosphere extremely sensitive to consumer problems.' 92 Second, it
contradicted the overwhelming legal precedent which has consistently
recognized the Attorney General's right to bring actions to protect the
public interest, whether statutorily given or not. 93
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in the case of Kugler v. Ro-
main,"" was recently confronted with a problem nearly identical to
that involved in People v. Superior Court. In resolving the issue in
favor of the Attorney General's right to seek restitution on behalf of a
class of defrauded consumers, the court took cognizance of the national
climate supporting expanded consumer remedies:
Obviously, a just resolution can be reached only through a sensitive
awareness of the climate of our time as it has been influenced by legis-
lative and judicial measures affecting the buyer-seller relationship in the
marketing of consumer goods. There can be no doubt that, in today's
society, sale of consumer goods, especially on an installment credit basis,
has become a matter of ever-increasing state and national anxiety. In
recent years, New Jersey lawmakers have become deeply concerned with
suppression of commercial deception in consumer transactions.195
188. Id. at 43.
189. CAL. CODE OF Clv. PROC. § 367 (West 1970).
190. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
191. Id.
192. See text accompanying notes 4 & 52 supra and notes 194-200 infra.
193. See text accompanying notes 212-35 infra.
194. 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971). In that case, the Attorney General of the State
of New Jersey sought an injunction and other appropriate relief against a seller of
"educational" materials for violations of the state's Consumer Fraud Act. Id. at 641-
42. The court entered judgment in favor of the Attorney General holding that, be-
cause the price of the educational material was two and one-half times its reasonable
market value and the materials sold had little or no educational value, the contracts
under which the goods were sold were rendered invalid. Id. at 653.
195. Id. at 647.
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California lawmakers are no less concerned with the suppression of
commercial deception in consumer transactions. The proliferation
of statutes dealing with the problem of consumer fraud clearly dem-
onstrates the emphasis which the California legislature has placed on
assuring that the consumer is adequately protected from unscrupulous
business practices. 196 The importance attached to the protection of
the consumer in today's society has also been underlined by the lan-
guage in a number of judicial decisions. 197 The California courts
have clearly recognized that, in light of this public policy of consumer
protection, statutes designed for the protection of consumers are to
be given a broad and liberal interpretation. For example, the court in
People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co.,98 in exploring the
meaning and purpose of Civil Code section 3369, noted that:
The very breadth of the terms used by the Legislature indicate, in our
judgment, an intent to be inclusive rather than restrictive in the practices
to be enjoined. We refrain from construing the language narrowly in
a field where the trend is opposed to unfair trade practices which affect
the public interest. As our Supreme Court has stated: "It is also to be
borne in mind that the rules of unfair competition are based, not alone
upon the protection of a property right existing in the complainants, but
also upon the right of the public to protection from fraud and deceit
"'99
In interpreting section 3369 in this broad way, the court was affirming
its belief that the legislature, in enacting this statute as well as others in
the field, was attempting to provide adequate protection for the con-
sumer against fraudulent business practices. In deciding whether the
Attorney General has the authority to seek restitution under statutes
clearly enacted for the benefit of consumers, this public policy favor-
ing the "right of the public to protection from fraud and deceit"
196. See note 4 supra.
197. In Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796
(1971), for example, the court commented that the "[P]rotection of unwary consumers
from being duped by unscrupulous sellers is an exigency of the utmost priority in con-
temporary society." Id. at 808, 484 P.2d at 968, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 800. See also the
opinions in the following cases which exemplify the courts' concern for consumers and
their desire to formulate effective relief: Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968); Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69
Cal. 2d 881, 447 P.2d 638, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968); Laczko v. Jules Meyes, Inc.,
276 Cal. App. 2d 293, 80 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1969); Horn v. Guaranty Chevrolet Motors,
270 CaL App. 2d 477, 75 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1969).
198. 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
199. Id. at 771, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 520-21, quoting Academy of Motion Pictures
Arts & Sciences v. Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 691, 104 P.2d 650, 653 (1940).
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should be a paramount consideration. °°
The erroneous decision of the court of appeal in People v. Superior
Court may be traceable to the court's apparent failure to take cogni-
zance of the strong public policy considerations aimed at guaranteeing
the consumer protection in the marketplace. Rather than recognize
these considerations, the court chose to distinguish, on rather narrow
grounds, the situations in which statutes have traditionally been held
to give rise to express or implied power in the Attorney General to in-
stitute actions which will adequately protect the consumer .201 The
first situation discussed by the court was that in which there exists a
statute specifically empowering the Attorney General to seek the de-
sired remedy.202  Clearly this situation was not applicable to the facts
presented in People v. Superior Court since, at the time, no statute
existed which specifically authorized the Attorney General to seek
restitution.20 3 The court next discussed those situations in which the
Attorney General seeks to utilize a remedy specifically provided for by
statute, even thoug, he is not expressly included within the class
authorized to bring an action for that remedy.204 The court noted that,
although in a proper case a court will construe such a statute to include
the Attorney General within the designated class, it will never do so
where, by definition, the statutory class precludes such a construction. 0 5
Although Civil Code section 1692 provides that an "aggrieved party"
can bring an action for restitution,206 the court concluded that the At-
torney General was not an "aggrieved party" within the meaning of
that term as used in the statute.207 The third situation distinguished by
the court involved those cases in which there exists a statute directly
authorizing the Attorney General to initiate an action to redress a
wrong, but where the particular remedy desired by the Attorney General
has not been expressly provided for in the statute .2 0  The court recog-
nized that when presented with such a factual situation a court may con-
strue the language of the statute to permit the desired remedy.20 How-
200. Id.
201. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
202- Id.
203. Id. A statute now exists which specifically recognizes the power of a court to
grant restitution in suits brought by the Attorney General to remedy unfair or fraudu-
lent business practices. See note 179 supra and text accompanying notes 245-46 infra.
204. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
205. Id.
206. CAL,. CIV. CODE § 1692 (West 1970).
207. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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ever, it decided that this alternative is available only when there is ap-
pended to the statute a broad enabling clause authorizing the Attorney
General to seek orders enforcing compliance with the law.210 Since the
Attorney General was unable to demonstrate the existence of a statute
containing the requisite enabling clause, the court felt constrained to
deny the restitutionary remedy sought.211
Through its narrow construction of the three categories discussed
above, the court clearly demonstrated its failure to recognize the
important policy considerations which underlie the tendency of courts
to construe statutes so as to provide the Attorney General with the
broadest possible remedial prerogatives. When a statute expressly
empowers the Attorney General to bring an action for a desired rem-
edy, there is, of course, no question as to the propriety of the Attor-
ney General's utilization of this remedy. But even when such au-
thority is not expressly authorized, the courts are not precluded from
empowering the Attorney General to bring an action for a desired
remedy if the court feels this remedy is essential to carrying out the
underlying policy of the statute.
211
The court in People v. Superior Court tacitly recognized the ar-
tificiality of the three categories it had constructed when it conceded
that, even when the facts in a particular case do not fall within any of
the statutory categories, a court may nonetheless allow the desired
remedy if the statutory remedies are not meant to be exclusive and if
the desired remedy would be available in a non-statutory action arising
from the same wrong.213 The court of appeal cited Orloff v. Los An-
geles Turf Club,21 4 in which injunctive relief had been allowed in
addition to the damages prescribed by the relevant statute, as an ex-
ample of such a situation. However, it distinguished Orloff by char-
acterizing restitution as an action rather than a remedy and refused
to take cognizance of the underlying rationale for the Orloff decision,
namely, that where a statutorily authorized remedy fails to effectively
carry out the purposes of the statute, the courts tend to exercise their
inherent equitable powers to grant the required remedies. 21
Common law precedent affords another basis for vindicating the
state's strong interest in providing adequate remedies for consumer
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See text accompanying notes 225-41 infra.
213. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
214. 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 (1947).
215. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 46. See text accompanying notes 225-41 infra.
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fraud through the recognition of authority in the Attorney General to
seek restitution for consumers injured by illegal business practices.
The court of appeal, although recognizing that the Attorney General
in his capacity as the chief law enforcement officer of the state has
the authority to institute actions on behalf of the people of the state in
cases involving directly their rights and interests, 210 emphasized that this
right is limited to situations where the rights and interests of the state
are truly direct.21 7  The court viewed the interest of the Attorney
General in seeking restitution for defrauded consumers as being com-
parable to a desire to intervene to block performance of an illegal con-
tract because such intervention would lessen his burden of prosecution
of violators of the law. 18  This is but another example of the extremely
narrow manner in which the court viewed the Attorney Generals
power to bring actions to remedy consumer wrongs.
The broad common law authority of the Attorney General was best
summarized in the case of People v. Centr-O-Mart,219 wherein the
court stated:
In the case of Pierce v. Superior Court, it was held that the attorney gen-
eral, as the chief law officer of the state, has broad powers derived from
common law, and in the absence of any legislative restriction, has the
power to file any civil action or proceeding directly involving the rights
and interest of the state, or which he deems necessary for the enforce-
ment of the law of the state, the preservation of order, and the protec-
tion of public rights and interests.
220
216. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
217. Id. at 47. For examples of cases wherein the court found sufficient direct
interest, see People v. Oakland Water Front Co., 118 Cal. 234, 50 P. 305 (1897);
People v. Brophy, 49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P.2d 946 (1942); People v. San Diego,
71 Cal. App. 421, 236 P. 377 (1925).
218. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
219. 34 Cal. 2d 702, 214 P.2d 378 (1950).
220. Id. at 704, 214 P.2d at 379-80 (citation omitted). Another case illustrating the
breadth of the Attorney General's common law power to bring an action to protect
public rights and interests is People ex rel Lynch v. San Diego Unified School Dist.,
19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1971). In Lynch the Attorney General of
California filed a petition for a writ of mandate directing the San Diego Unified School
District to take steps to alleviate racial imbalance in the district's schools. Id. at
257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 660. The court, in rejecting the district's contention that the
Attorney General lacked standing to bring the suit, commented on the breadth of the
Attorney General's power:
At the outset we consider and reject the District's contention the attorney gen-
eral lacks standing to bring the action. Our conclusion is premised on the settled
rule in California that the Attorney General is authorized "to file any civil action
for the enforcement of the laws of the state or the United States Constitution,
which in the absence of legislative restriction he deems necessary for the protection
of public rights and interests." Id. at 258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 661, citing People
ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 910, 912, 464 P.2d 126, 127, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 670, 671 (1971).
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In Centr-O-Mart, the District Attorney of San Joaquin had brought
an action against the defendant to enjoin certain violations of the Un-
fair Trade Practices Act. 2 ' The express purposes of that Act are to
safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies
and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair, dishon-
est, deceptive, destructive, fraudulent and discriminatory practices by
which fair and honest competition is destroyed or prevented.
222
Public officers, however, were not specifically included among the
persons who could bring an action under the Act. 2 8  Despite this,
the court allowed the Attorney General to maintain a suit under the
Act since this would further the statutory purposes and since the lan-
guage of the statute did not specifically exclude him from bringing
such an action.224
Although the factual situation involved in Centr-O-Mart was clearly
distinguishable from that in People v. Superior Court, the court of ap-
peal erred in emphasizing this distinguishability when emphasis should
have been on the similarity of the public policy considerations under-
lying the situation in each case. Thus, applying the logic of the
Centr-O-Mart case, the Attorney General should have the right, even
in absence of statute, to bring actions for restitution of money fraudu-
lently taken from individual consumers.
As has been shown above, there exist two bases upon which the At-
torney General can invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court: he
can exercise his statutory authority to do so under either Civil Code
section 33692 5 or Business and Professions Code section 17500,220 or
he can bring an action pursuant to his common law power to protect
the interests of the people of California. 227  Once the Attorney Gen-
eral has properly invoked the jurisdiction of the court, that court
should be able to exercise the full range of its inherent equitable
powers. The traditional view of the courts with respect to the extent
221. CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE ANN. §§ 17000-101 (West 1970).
222. Id. § 17001.
223. Id. § 17070, which provides: "Any person or trade association may bring an
action to enjoin and restrain any violation of this chapter and, in addition thereto, for
the recovery of damages."
224. 34 Cal. 2d at 704, 214 P.2d at 380; accord, Pierce v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d
759, 37 P.2d 453 (1934); People v. Arthur Murray, 238 Cal. App. 2d 333, 47 Cal. Rptr.
700 (1965); Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 77, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 621 (1963).
225. See text accompanying notes 139-40 supra.
226. See text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
227. See text accompanying notes 216-24 supra.
[Vol. 6
COMMENTS
to which their equitable powers allow them to render adequate relief
in cases properly before them is well illustrated by the case of People
ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co.22 8  The defendants in National
Research Co. were accused of violating Civil Code section 3369 by
mailing out questionnaires resembling official documents of the State of
California and the United States.22 9 Actually the documents were part
of a scheme engineered by collection agencies to facilitate the gathering
of information about debtors. 230  The Attorney General sued to enjoin
the defendants from engaging in this unfair and deceptive practice
231
and was held to be entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant not
only from selling, handling or otherwise dealing in the bogus letters from
California, but also from engaging in these acts from Washington, D.C.,
or any other place.232  The appellate court considered the question of
whether the judgment granted was too broad in that it extended the effect
of the decree to activities outside the State of California and found
no abuse of discretion or excess in the use of equitable remedies in the
decree as granted. Equity is not limited in scope or type of relief which
may be granted. Its decrees are molded in accordance with the exi-
gencies of each case and the rights of the persons over whom it has
acquired jurisdiction.
233
The court noted that it is often necessary, in order to insure that full
justice is attained, to grant relief as varied and diversified as the means
used to produce the grievance complained of.2 4  It supported its
recognition of the need for broad and imaginative relief to combat
unfair business practices as being consistent with analogous federal
decisional law:
[Because] of the similarity of language and obvious identity of purpose
of the two statutes [Civil Code § 3369 and 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)],
228. 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962).
229. Id. at 768, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 518-19.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 774-75, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
233. Id.
234. Id. The "flexible and expanding" type of relief a court of equity may give
was stressed in Holibaugh v. Stokes, 192 Cal. App. 2d 564, 13 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1961).
In Holibaugh plaintiff loaned one Mrs. Stokes money with which to purchase property
upon her agreement to execute a note and deed of trust to the plaintiff. Id. at 566,
13 Cal. Rptr. at 529. However, in contravention of her agreement, Mrs. Stokes bor-
rowed additional money from another person and gave this person deeds to the prop-
erty in question. Id. The trial court held that said deeds were in fact mortgages and
gave plaintiff liens on these mortgages for the amount loaned. Id. at 567, 13 Cal.
Rptr. at 529. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's findings relying upon the
broad equitable powers of the courts to fashion those remedies essential to achieving a
just result. Id. at 568, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
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decisions of the federal courts on the subject are more than ordinarily
persuasive. 235
In Decorative Carpets, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization,230 Deco-
rative Carpets had over a period of years erroneously collected ex-
cessive sales taxes from its customers and had then paid said taxes
to the state.237  Upon realizing its error, Decorative Carpets brought
suit to require the State Board of Equalization to refund to Decorative
Carpets the tax paid in excess of the amount actually due. 218  Al-
though the California statutes established a procedure whereby Dec-
orative Carpets could obtain a refund of overpaid taxes, they con-
tained no specific provision, which would have required the carpet
company to reimburse its customers.23 9 The court used its equitable
power to mold a remedy to fit the circumstances of the case in holding
the carpet company to be the constructive trustee of the tax reimburse-
ment and ordering it to repay to its customers the amounts erroneously
collected.2 40  The court reasoned that to do less would be to "sanction
a misuse of the sales tax by a retailer for his private gain."24' In a
broader consumer context, if money obtained through unfair or
fraudulent business practices is not repaid to the wronged consumer,
the courts would be, in much the same way, sanctioning the fraudulent
act by permitting the wrongdoer to keep his ill-gotten gains.
The California Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in People v.
Superior Court quickly disposed of the restitution issue. Justice Mosk
simply noted that, absent a statutory restriction on the court's general
equity jurisdiction, "a court of equity may exercise the full range of
its inherent powers in order to accomplish complete justice between
the parties, restoring if necessary the status quo ante as nearly as may
be achieved. '2 42  Viewing the restitutionary relief sought by the Attor-
ney General under section 17535 as an ancillary remedy under that
section, rather than as a separate cause of action, the supreme court
held that the trial court had the inherent power to order the defendants
to make or offer to make restitution to the individual defrauded con-
sumers. 43 The court did not elaborate on the reasons for this con-
235. 201 Cal. App. 2d at 773, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
236. 58 Cal. 2d 252, 373 P.2d 637, 23 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1962).
237. Id. at 253-54, 373 P.2d at 637-38, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
238. Id. at 254, 373 P.2d at 638, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
239. Id. at 255-56, 373 P.2d at 639, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 255, 373 P.2d at 638, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
242. 9 Cal. 3d at 286, 507 P.2d at 1402, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (emphasis added).
243. Id.
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clusion, although it did cite the National Research Co. case and the
analogous federal cases discussed in the National Research Co. opin-
ion.' The court also observed that the legislature had recently
amended section 17535 to explicitly recognize the courts' inherent
power to order restitution. 245  This amendment, stated the court, was
not intended to create any new power in the trial courts but rather to
clarify existing law regarding the existence of the courts' inherent
equitable powers.
246
CONCLUSION
Although the legislature and the courts have sought to expand the
private remedies for consumer fraud, the social, economic and legal
problems involved in the utilization of individual or class actions are
currently substantial enough to prevent adequate protection of the con-
sumer through purely private suits. 247  Most of the social and eco-
nomic problems can be avoided by utilizing the existent, although lim-
ited, resources of the Attorney General to protect the consumer from
widespread abuses. 248  Until quite recently, however, even the Attor-
ney General was not clearly afforded adequate legal remedies.
249
With the passage of supplementary statutory measures by the legisla-
ture250 and the announcement by the supreme court, in People v.
Superior Court, of a policy favoring full exercise of the courts' reme-
dial powers to protect the consumer in actions brought by the Attor-
ney General,251 the importance of a strong public role has clearly
been recognized. The Attorney General's Office can now, through
statutory and decisional law, seek injunctions,25 2 criminal and civil
penalties, 253 and individual restitution 254 to remedy most fraudulent
business practices within California. Although certain deficiencies
still exist, the overall remedial scheme is much broader and more flexible
now than it was prior to 1972.
Robert D. Sevell
244. Id. See text accompanying notes 196-200, 225-35 supra.
245. 9 Cal. 3d at 287 n.1, 507 P.2d at 1402 n.1, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194 n.1.
246. Id.
247. See text accompanying notes 14-127 supra.
248. See text accompanying notes 128-33 supra.
249. See text accompanying notes 170-91 supra.
250. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 17535 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3370.1 (West Supp. 1973).
251. 9 Cal. 3d at 286, 507 P.2d at 1402, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
252. See text accompanying notes 134-56 supra.
253. See text accompanying notes 157-75 supra.
254. See note 179 and text accompanying notes 242-46 supra.
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